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Abstract:  This paper presents a model of human recognition, a concept defined as the 
acknowledgement provided to an individual that he is of inherent value with intrinsic 
qualities in common with the recognizer.  The model describes provision and receipt of 
human recognition, its contribution to utility, its effects on health and labor supply, and 
the role it plays in development programs.  The model provides a theoretical basis for 
understanding human recognition, lays the foundation for empirical study, and offers an 
example  of how non-material components of development can be formally modeled.   
Key predictions from the model are that human recognition has a positive, causal 
relationship with utility, health outcomes, and labor supply; that multiple equilibria for 
human recognition can exist, and groups can be stuck in low-level equilibria; and that 
only accounting for the instrumental effects recognition has on material outcomes while 
ignoring its direct effects on utility leads to suboptimal programs. 
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1. Introduction 
Human recognition is defined as the acknowledgement provided to an individual 
by other individuals, groups, or organizations that he is of inherent value with intrinsic 
qualities in common with the recognizer (Castleman 2011).  It is hypothesized that this 
concept of recognition as a fellow human being plays a significant role in social and 
economic development processes and outcomes.  
This paper develops a theoretical economic model of human recognition to 
formally describe human recognition, provide the framework for quantifying recognition 
transactions, and generate specific hypotheses for empirical testing.  Human recognition 
is a challenging concept to model because there may not be visible costs or benefits 
associated with human recognition transactions.  This initial model of human recognition 
describes several aspects of human recognition and may also serve as a basis for 
modeling other non-material dimensions of development such as empowerment, social 
capital, or social exclusion.  An earlier paper (Castleman 2011) reviewed work done by 
others studying non-material dimensions of development, and where possible this paper 
builds on that work. 
The model in this paper describes the flow and stock of human recognition, 
determinants of human recognition provision, the contribution of human recognition to 
utility, the effects human recognition has on health and labor supply, and the role human 
recognition plays in program design and outcomes.  The primary predictions from the 
theory are:  human recognition levels significantly affect utility, health outcomes and 
labor supply; these relationships are positive; there is complementarity in human 
recognition provision, which under certain circumstances leads to multiple equilibria with 4 
 
a low-level equilibrium where people mostly provide negative recognition to others and a 
high-level equilibrium where people mostly provide positive recognition; and full 
consideration of human recognition in the design of interventions improves program 
outcomes. 
  Section II describes determinants of the human recognition that an individual 
receives and presents a functional relationship between received recognition and total 
recognition.  Section III models the provision of human recognition and examines 
conditions for multiple equilibria of human recognition.  The contribution of human 
recognition to utility is modeled in Section IV, and a specific case of recognition’s 
contribution to labor supply is modeled in Section V.  Section VI incorporates human 
recognition into a model of development programs, and Section VII concludes. 
 
II. Receipt of Human Recognition 
Received recognition 
Individuals receive human recognition from other individuals, and in some cases 
from groups or organizations.  Human recognition may be positive or negative.  Positive 
recognition refers to acknowledgment that an individual is of value as a human being, 
and negative human recognition refers to viewing an individual as lacking inherent value 
as a human being or not acknowledging this value.  A previous paper (Castleman 2011) 
provides a more in-depth description and analysis of the nature of human recognition. 
The total quantity of human recognition an individual receives is a function of the 
recognition received from each of the individuals, groups, and organizations that provide 
recognition to her.  Based on observed behavior and understanding of the nature of 5 
 
human recognition, it is posited that the expression for the level of human recognition an 
individual receives should satisfy the four properties described below. 
Property 1 – MONOTONICITY:  For an individual i who receives recognition 
from a vector of individuals (1, 2 …n) where each providing individual provides a 
quantity of recognition, qh, h = 1…n and q∈R, an increase in the quantity of 
human recognition qj provided by one individual j, holding all other values of qh 
constant, increases the total recognition received by i,
r i r . 
Property 1 states that holding all else equal, increasing the magnitude of positive 
recognition (or decreasing the magnitude of negative recognition) that one individual 
provides to i will increase the total recognition received by i. 
A corollary property is given below for the special case in which an individual 
receives the same quantity of recognition from all individuals who provide recognition to 
him/her. 
Property 1A - MONOTONICITY:  For an individual i who receives a given 
quantity of human recognition, q, from each of a vector of individuals (1, 2 …n) 
such that q∈R, and q is the same for each individual (q1=q2…=qn), the 
magnitude of the total human recognition received by i, 
r i r , is directly 
proportional to the number of individuals providing recognition to him, i.e. the 
magnitude of 
r i r  will be larger for larger n. 
For example, receiving five units
1 of positive recognition from 20 people (and no 
                                                 
1 Practically speaking, measurable units of recognition do not exist in the same sense that measurable units 
of income or education do, but quantifying units offers a useful structure for the model, and as 
demonstrated in other papers (Castleman 2011b; Castleman 2011c), human recognition levels can be 
quantified empirically. 6 
 
recognition transactions with anyone else) will result in a higher level of total received 
recognition than receiving five units of positive recognition from only one person (and no 
recognition transactions with anyone else).  Note that the property refers to magnitudes 
and in the case of negative recognition (q < 0), increasing the number of individuals will 
decrease the level but increase the magnitude of total recognition received.   
  Property 1 describes the special case in which an individual receives the same 
quantity of human recognition from each of the individuals providing recognition to him, 
but the property applies to more general cases as well.  Consider a set of individuals (e.g. 
one neighbor, one colleague, and one relative), each of whom provides a fixed quantity of 
recognition to individual i.  Neighbors may provide different quantities of recognition 
than colleagues, but every neighbor provides the same quantity of human recognition to i.  
If Property 1 holds, then the magnitude of recognition received will be greater the more 
sets of individuals that i interacts with.   
Property 2 - DIMINISHING RETURNS TO ADDITIONAL PROVIDERS:  For 
an individual i who receives a given quantity of human recognition, q, from each 
of a vector of individuals (1, 2 …n) such that q∈R and q is the same for each 
individual (q1=q2…=qn), the effect an additional input of q quantity of recognition 
by an additional individual, n+1, has on the magnitude of total human 
recognition received by i, |
r i r |, is inversely proportional to the number of 
individuals providing recognition to him, i.e. the magnitude of the change in 
r i r  
will be smaller for larger n. 
The intuition behind this corollary is that receiving recognition from a larger 
number of people insulates an individual, dampening the effect of any single human 7 
 
recognition transaction.  Receiving five units of recognition from someone will have a 
greater effect on an individual if that is the only person from whom she receives 
recognition than it will if she is already receiving the same or similar quantities of 
recognition from others. 
This property can also be expressed in terms of a given quantity of recognition 
received.   
Property 2A – DIMINISHING RETURNS TO ADDITIONAL PROVIDERS:  
For a given quantity, Q, of human recognition received by individual i from a 






 where q∈R and where there 
is no restriction that q1=q2…=qn, the magnitude of the total human recognition 
received by i, 
r i r , is inversely proportional to the number of individuals providing 
recognition to him, i.e. the magnitude of 
r i r  will be smaller for larger n. 
This property means, for example, that receiving one unit of human recognition 
from each of ten people leads to less total recognition received than receiving ten units of 
recognition from one person.  The intuition behind this property is that receipt of large 
quantities of positive recognition (e.g. an empathetic sacrifice) or negative recognition 
(e.g. violence or severe humiliation) has a larger effect on the receiving individual than 
repeated receipt of small quantities of recognition from various individuals.     
Property 3 – EQUIVALENCE OF PROVIDERS NOT REQUIRED:  If 
individuals j and h each provide the same quantity of recognition, r, to individual 
i, the effects of j’s and h’s provision of recognition on the total level of 
recognition individual i receives, 
r i r , will not necessarily be equal and will 8 
 
depend on the relationship between the providing individual and i.   
The intuition behind this property is clear.  For example, the same recognition 
provided by a spouse or parent may have greater weight than that provided by a neighbor, 
shopkeeper, or stranger. 
Property 4 – INCREASING EFFECTS OF DIFFERENCES IN RECEIVED 
RECOGNITION:  For an individual i who receives a quantity, Q, of recognition 






 where q∈R and 
where there is no restriction that q1=q2…=qn, the magnitude of the effect that 
recognition provided by an additional individual, qn+1, has on total human 
recognition received by i, 
r i r , is directly proportional to the magnitude of the 
difference between the new recognition received, qn+1 and the net quantity of 
recognition currently received, Q, for all cases in which |qn+1| > |Q|. 
That is, if |qn+1| > |Q|, then | qn+1 - Q|↑ ⇒ |∆ ↑ |
r i r ,  
where ∆
r i r =  ) 1 .... 1 ( + n r
r i  -  ) .... 1 ( n r
r i . 
This property states that in cases where an additional input of recognition is of 
greater magnitude than the level of recognition otherwise received, the input of 
recognition has a greater impact on an individual the greater the magnitude of the 
difference between the new input and the other received recognition inputs
2.  This 
property is of particular relevance in developing country settings where provision of 
                                                 
2 The condition |qn+1| > |Q| is necessary because inputs of small quantities of recognition may not have a 
significant effect on total recognition received even if it is much less than the quantity of recognition 
otherwise received.  For example, if Q=20, and additional input of qn+1 = 30 is likely to have greater effect 
than qn+1 = 5, even though the magnitude of the difference | qn+1 - Q| is greater for qn+1 = 5 than it is for 
qn+1 = 30. 9 
 
positive recognition may have the greatest impact on individuals who otherwise receive 
significant negative recognition from others.  Consider a poor woman who toils under 
inhumane conditions at a factory and is the subject of regular domestic abuse at home.  If 
someone, say a health care worker, provides her with a large quantity of negative human 
recognition and treats her in a humiliating manner, the change in the total level of 
recognition the woman receives may be relatively small.  But if the health care worker 
provides her a high magnitude of positive recognition – asking about and addressing her 
concerns, providing counseling, etc. – there may be a significant change in the total level 
of recognition the woman receives. 
The following proposition identifies an expression for human recognition that 
satisfies these properties: 
Proposition 1:  The expression, 







ρ , satisfies Properties 1 – 4.       
 
The term rhi is the recognition that individual h provides to individual i, and ρhi is 
a parameter that represents a provider-specific weight that captures differences in the 
impact a given level of provided recognition has on individual i’s received recognition.  
In addition to capturing differences between providers (e.g. between a spouse and 
neighbor), ρhi also captures differences among receiving individuals in how they convert 
provision of a given level of provided recognition into received recognition.  Individuals 
may vary in their inherent resilience or “set points” for recognition, which may affect 
how they absorb recognition provided by others, e.g. some may brush off negative 
recognition provided by others while others may take it to heart.   
During the period of analysis, individual i interacts with n individuals who 10 
 
provide varying levels of human recognition to her.  An individual likely interacts with 
more than n individuals during the period, but only interactions that involve receipt of 
human recognition are included in n.  Groups, organizations, or institutions that provide 
recognition through processes or mechanisms other than one-to-one interactions can also 
be included in the n entities, but for simplicity in the model we refer to the n entities as 
individuals.  This model combines human recognition received from all sources into one 
expression.  Another paper (Castleman 2011b) focuses on measurement and distinguishes 
among recognition received in different domains of one’s life. 
The r terms may be positive or negative, signifying positive or negative human 










represents the weighted sum of human recognition received through interactions with 
others.   
Proof of Proposition 1: 
1.  MONOTONICITY:  To prove monotonicity, we need to show that for the 
conditions described in Property 1, an increase in qj leads to an increase in 









Let Q0 = ji j
n
h
hi h r r ρ ρ − ∑
=1
. That is, Q0 represents all recognition inputs that i 
receives except for j’s input. 
 
r i r  = 
n










> 0.  The Q0 term can be treated as a constant in the differentiation 
because it does not change with qj.  QED. 







r i  for the case described in Property 1A.  
Using the above expression for 
r i r  and the conditions given in Property 1A,  
qh= hi hr ρ  and q1 = q2… = qn. 
So 
























When q > 0, 
r i r > 0.  When q < 0, 
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r i .  QED.  
2.  DIMINSHING RETURNS TO ADDITIONAL PROVIDERS:  To prove this 
















































When q > 0, 
r i r ∆ > 0.  When q < 0, 





will be smaller than 
n
1
 . (n is always positive.)   
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r i .  QED. 







r i for the case described in Property 2A.  
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When Q > 0, 
r i r > 0.  When Q < 0, 
r i r <0.  For Q > 0,  . 0
2
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For Q < 0,  . 0
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r i .  QED. 
3.  EQUIVALENCE OF PROVIDERS NOT REQUIRED:  The parameter ρhi is a 
provider-specific weight that accounts for differences among providers in the 
impact a given level of provided recognition has on an individual’s received 
recognition.  Since these parameters differ for different receiving individuals (i) as 
well as for different providing individuals (h), the parameters also capture 
r i r13 
 
differences in receiving individuals’ conversion of provided recognition into 
received recognition. 
4.  INCREASING EFFECTS OF DIFFERENCES IN RECEIVED RECOGNITION:   
To prove this property, we need to show that for the conditions given in the 










ir   
Let d = qn+1 - Q.  Given the condition that |qn+1| > |Q|, there are two possible cases: 
qn+1 > Q ⇒ qn+1 > 0, d > 0, 
r i r ∆ > 0. 
qn+1 < Q ⇒ qn+1 < 0, d < 0, 
r i r ∆ < 0. 
That is, when qn+1 > Q, the addition of qn+1 increases total received recognition so 
r i r ∆ > 0, and when qn+1 < Q, the addition of qn+1 decreases total received 
recognition so ∆
r i r < 0.  In both cases, d and ∆
r i r are the same signs, so for an 
increase in the magnitude of d to lead to an increase in the magnitude of 
r i r as 
Property 4 states, it means that an increase in d leads to an increase in 
r i r . That is, 



























d = qn+1 – Q.  




































































































r r i i   QED.    
The expression 







ρ satisfies Properties 1 – 4.    
One way in which the above expression may not accurately reflect actual 
experience is that the model suggests that for individuals receiving high magnitudes of 
positive (negative) recognition, the impact of receiving modest quantities of positive 
(negative) recognition from additional providers is to reduce the magnitude of total 
recognition received.  In some cases this may be true, but generally it is unlikely that 
receipt of modest levels of positive recognition reduces the level of total recognition 
received for those already receiving high levels of positive recognition.  This issue can be 
addressed to some extent by introduction of time units for analysis.   
However, this issue is related to the summing of recognition received from 
different individuals and does not affect empirical analysis if measurement of recognition 
relies on indicators of the incidence of specific types of interactions or relies on self-
reported levels of recognition received, instead of relying on a summation of recognition 
received from each provider.  As discussed elsewhere (Castleman 2011b), the empirical 
measurement methods employed use indicators of specific interactions and self-reported 
recognition and does not sum over individual interactions.  Therefore, the issue described 
above does not pose problems for the empirical applications. 15 
 
Total recognition 
  The 
r i r term represents the quantity of human recognition an individual receives in 
a given period of analysis.  Related but distinct from this is an individual’s total level of 
human recognition, which is signified by Ri in the model.  The total level of human 
recognition refers to the overall level of recognition an individual has at a given point of 
time and is determined by 1) the quantity of human recognition received in the time 
period of analysis, 
r i r ; 2) the quantity of recognition received in the past (including 
during childhood) which may be discounted to account for its diminishing effect on one’s 
current total level of recognition; and 3) how received recognition accumulates and is 
“stored”. 
An individual’s total level of recognition, Ri, is determined by a function 
  Ri = f(
r i r ,  i r ) = f(
r i r +  i r ) 
 where  i r is the base level of recognition individual i has at the beginning of the period of 
analysis and includes the discounted present value of human recognition received in the 
past.  The function f(..) describes how received recognition accumulates and is stored as 
total recognition. 
  Based on understanding of how human recognition transactions operate 
(Castleman 2011), it is posited that the function f(r), for r = 
r i r +  i r , should satisfy the 
following properties: 
  Property 1 – NON-DECREASING IN THE ARGUMENT:  f’(r) > 0 for all r.   
The function does not decrease in its argument because, consistent with intuition, 
higher (lower) levels of received or base recognition lead to higher (lower) levels of total 16 
 
recognition.  (This could be expressed as “increasing in the argument” except for cases 
where r = 0 in which case f’(r) may equal 0; see proof below.) 
Property 2 - DECREASING MARGINAL EFFECTS FOR HIGHER 
ABSOLUTE VALUE OF THE ARGUMENT:  f’’(r) < 0 for r > 0, and f’’(r) > 0 
for r < 0.  An inflection point exists at r = 0. 
The marginal effects of the function decrease in greater positive values of the 
argument and decrease in greater magnitudes of negative values of the argument.  These 
second order conditions mean that as the absolute value of r increases, the marginal effect 
that additional received recognition has on total levels of recognition diminishes.  That is, 
a given input of human recognition has less of an effect on individuals who already have 
very large positive or negative levels of recognition than it does on those with moderate 
or low magnitudes of recognition.  For example, an instance of being humiliated publicly 
by one’s employer has less of an effect on the total recognition level of an individual who 
is regularly treated poorly by his employer and family than the same incident would have 
on someone who is treated moderately well by both employer and family.  This is again a 
case of high magnitudes of human recognition insulating an individual from the effect of 
additional recognition inputs, or viewed another way, high magnitudes diluting the 
impact of a given input of recognition. 
Proposition 2:  The following functional form satisfies Properties 1 and 2 above: 


















Proof of Proposition 2: 




















   QED. 
2. DECREASING MARGINAL EFFECTS FOR HIGHER ABSOLUTE VALUE 
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For r > 0, as r increases (and |r| increases), f’’(r) decreases; for r < 0, as r 
decreases (and |r| increases), f’’(r) decreases, meeting the condition of decreasing 
marginal effects for higher absolute value of r.  QED. 
Figure 1 graphs this function. 
 
Figure 1:  Relationship between an Individual’s Received and Base Levels (r) and 
Total Level (R) of Human Recognition 
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When health and consumption functions are specified in Section IV, the R 
function is assumed to be asymptotic, with a maximum magnitude R’.  For the general 
model, however, the function is not required to be asymptotic. 
One issue of relevance to development settings is that when an individual has a 
high level of negative recognition (deep in the 4
th quadrant) the marginal effect of an 
input of negative recognition is less than the marginal effect of an equivalent input of 
positive recognition.  The difference in these effects grows larger the greater the 
magnitude of negative recognition the individual has (the deeper into the 4
th quadrant one 
is located).  An example of this is the case described earlier of asymmetry between the 
effects a health worker’s positive and negative recognition have on an otherwise poorly 
treated woman.   
In the model, this asymmetry between positive and negative inputs stems from 
two sources.  First, according to Property 4 of the expression for received recognition, the 
greater the difference between a new input of recognition and the existing level of 
received recognition, the greater the new input’s impact will be (for cases where the 
magnitude of the new input is greater than the existing level of inputs).  So when an 
individual who has received large quantities of negative recognition receives an 
additional large input of negative recognition, its effect on the level of recognition 
received is significantly less than the effect of an additional input of positive recognition 
of the same magnitude.  The level of received recognition is then translated into an 
individual’s total level of recognition by the f(r) function, which is an increasing 
function.  Therefore, at negative (or positive) magnitudes of total recognition there is 
asymmetry between the effects an input of negative recognition and an input of positive 19 
 
recognition of the same magnitude will have on total recognition level.  At negative 
recognition levels positive inputs will have a greater effect than negative inputs of the 
same magnitude, and at positive recognition levels negative inputs will have a greater 
effect.
3 
The second source of asymmetry is the second order condition of the f(r) function.  
Because f’(r) decreases as the magnitude of r increases, for an individual receiving net 
positive recognition (quadrant 1 of the graph) the marginal effect of an additional input of 
positive recognition is less than the marginal effect of the same quantity of negative 
recognition; and vice versa for an individual receiving net negative recognition (quadrant 
4).  
This model of receipt of recognition lays the foundation for methods to measure 
receipt of human recognition, and the model can be built on to develop a method for 
empirically measuring receipt of human recognition (Castleman 2011b). 
 
III. Provision of Human Recognition 
In addition to describing receipt of human recognition, a model of human 
recognition transactions must also describe provision of human recognition.  In this 
model individuals choose how much recognition to provide to others by balancing the 
marginal benefits and marginal costs of recognition provision.  There are also likely to be 
                                                 
3 A simple numerical example helps to illustrate these points.  Suppose an individual receives -5 units of 
human recognition from 8 individuals all of whom have weights of ρ = 1.  Applying the expression for 
received recognition, the individual’s level of received recognition is 
r i r = -14.1.  Assuming a base level of 
recognition of zero and α = 0.5, his total level of recognition is Ri = -3.76.  If someone then provides him 
with -8 units of human recognition, his new 
r i r = -16 and his new Ri = -4.  If instead of -8 someone 
provides +8 units of human recognition, the individual’s new 
r i r = -10.67 and his new Ri = -3.27.  The 
positive recognition input leads to a change in total recognition level (+0.49) that is twice the magnitude of 
the change in total recognition (-0.24) from the negative recognition input. 20 
 
exogenous determinants of human recognition provision that are independent of benefits 
and costs, such as an individual’s personality, cultural factors, or conditioning by role 
models in the individual’s past or present environment.  These exogenous determinants 
may be quite important and affect the total quantity of recognition provided and can be 
influenced by interventions such as counseling, other psychosocial interventions, or 
deliberate introduction of role models.  However, these determinants are not included in 
the model, which focuses on individual choices of recognition provision based on 
benefits and costs in order to enable more meaningful analysis of human recognition 
transactions. 
The amount of human recognition individual i provides to others is represented by 
rij, for j = 1….m, where i interacts with m individuals to whom she has the opportunity to 
provide human recognition.  rij can be positive or negative.  Note that m does not 
necessarily equal n from the previous section because the people from whom one 
receives recognition do not necessarily coincide with those to whom one provides 
recognition.  Individuals often have the greatest opportunity and choice about provision 
of recognition to those with less power than oneself (Castleman 2011) so the individuals 
one receives recognition from may differ from those one provides recognition to.  The 
model allows an individual to provide different levels of human recognition to different 
individuals, so values of rij  can vary for j = 1…m.  The value of rij is determined by 
individual i’s maximization process.  For each individual to whom she provides 
recognition, i chooses the level of human recognition to provide based on her own 
benefits and costs.    
The benefits to individual i of providing a given level of human recognition, rij, to 21 
 
individual j are given by: 
  B(rij) = µ(rij)+ Ψ(Ri, rij). 
The µ(rij) function represents the material benefits to person i of providing human 
recognition rij to person j.  µ’ can be positive or negative, depending on the situation.  µ’ 
will be negative in cases where provision of negative recognition enables exploitation 
that materially benefits the individual providing recognition, e.g. inhumane workplace 
conditions that generate greater profits, or domestic abuse that extracts higher dowry 
payments.  µ’ will be positive in cases where provision of positive recognition materially 
benefits the individual providing it, e.g. a teacher who can improve enrollment or 
attendance – and consequently increase his salary – by providing students with greater 
human recognition. 
There are two types of cases in which provision of human recognition generates 
material benefits.  The examples given above of using inhumane conditions or abuse to 
extract greater financial reward are examples of how provision of human recognition 
(negative in this case) can lead to changes in production or terms of exchange based on 
factors outside of market mechanisms.  In the case of inhumane workplace conditions, 
provision of negative recognition enables employers to reduce costs of production by, for 
instance, requiring long hours and offering poor benefits.  In the case of dowry 
extraction, provision of negative recognition enables coercion of additional payment 
without offering additional commensurate goods or services – other than the implicit 
offer to reduce or terminate abuse upon receipt of payment.   
This type of case requires significant differences in power between the provider 
and receiver of recognition in order for the former to be able to extract additional material 22 
 
benefits or rent from the latter.  And the provision of negative recognition can further 
reinforce this power differential.  If employees have sufficient power or alternative 
employment options, they may demand higher wages to compensate for the poor 
conditions, which leads to the second type of case described below.  If the wife or her 
family has sufficient power or alternative options and has cultural and social latitude, she 
may leave the household rather than tolerate the abuse or pay the additional dowry. 
The second type of case is a hedonic market, in which provision of recognition 
serves as a compensating differential to which prices (including wages), supply, and 
demand adjust.  The labor model presented in Section V is an example of this type of 
case.  Workers choose to provide greater supply of labor if greater levels of human 
recognition are provided at the workplace, for a given wage and non-labor income.  The 
model predicts that an employer can increase labor inputs by increasing the levels of 
human recognition provided to employees. 
As referred to above, a distinguishing condition that influences which type of case 
occurs is the power differential between the provider and receiver of recognition.  Greater 
power differentials increase the possibilities for human recognition transactions to 
generate non-market factors that affect production or terms of exchange, and smaller 
power differentials increase the likelihood of hedonic markets. 
The two types of cases are not mutually exclusive.  Situations exist that can be 
reasonably interpreted as either type of case.  The example given above of the teacher 
whose provision of positive human recognition improves enrollment and attendance, 
thereby increasing his salary, could be interpreted as a case of recognition being a non-
market factor that increases enrollment and teacher compensation.  Alternatively, one 23 
 
could interpret the recognition as a compensating differential leading to greater demand 
for education on the part of students and their families.    
The Ψ(Ri, rij) function in the expression of benefits represents the psychic benefits 
to person i of providing human recognition rij to person j.  U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
Thurgood Marshall said, “In recognizing the humanity of our fellow beings, we pay 
ourselves the highest tribute”, which eloquently describes the positive psychic utility that 
can be gained by providing positive human recognition to others.  Ri is in the argument 
because one’s own level of recognition can affect the psychic benefits gained from 
providing human recognition to others, and the properties of the function Ψ determine the 
direction and extent of this effect.  The sign of the cross-partial 




whether there is complementarity in provision of human recognition among individuals, 
and the magnitude of 
i ijR r ∂
Ψ ∂
2
 determines the strength of the relationship between one’s 
own recognition level and the recognition one provides to others.  The model presented 
below restricts the value of the cross-partial to 
i ijR r ∂
Ψ ∂
2
 > 0, indicating a positive 
relationship between one’s own level of recognition and the psychic benefits of 
recognition provided to others.  This is based on documented experiences about how the 
treatment people receive affects their treatment of others.  For example, it has been 
widely documented that those abused as children are more likely to abuse their own 
children (Oliver 1993), and there is evidence that domestic violence offenders who are 
treated respectfully by arresting officers are less likely to become repeat offenders (Lind 
and Tyler 1988).  Note that even with this assumption of a positive cross-partial and 24 
 
complementarity, an individual with positive levels of recognition may still choose to 
provide negative recognition to others (or vice versa) if the material benefits and costs 
dominate the psychic benefits.  
The costs to individual i of providing a given level of human recognition, rij, to 
person j are given by: 
C(rij) = α(rij
2) + β(rij). 
There are some positive costs, α(rij
2), associated with providing either positive or 
negative human recognition to others; these costs may involve time, effort, or other 
inputs.  For these costs, the marginal costs are increasing, as the polynomial term 
indicates; this reflects situations in which providing small amounts of recognition incurs 
very little cost but providing larger quantities requires larger investments of inputs.  
There are also some costs, β(rij), that are positive for provision of positive human 
recognition and negative for provision of negative human recognition.  In some situations 
providing negative recognition incurs fewer short-term costs than providing positive 
recognition does because treating people well requires greater investment of time or other 
inputs than treating them poorly does. 
An individual determines how much recognition to provide someone by 
maximizing her own net benefits or payoff.  The following simple linear functional 
forms,  
µ(rij) = µrij; Ψ(ri, rij) = rijψ(Ri); α(rij
2) = αrij
2; β(rij) = βrij, for µ, α, β > 0,     
yield the following payoff function:  
  πi(rij) = µrij + rijψ(Ri) − αrij
2 − βrij. 
 
Note that only rij is a choice variable, not Ri since what the individual has control over is 25 
 
the level of recognition provided to others, not one’s own level of recognition.  So the 
individual solves 
  max πi(rij) = µrij + rijψ(Ri)  − αrij
2 − βrij. 
   {rij} 
 








∂ ) ( π
 = µ + ψ(Ri)− 2αrij − β.   
 
At the optimum, the marginal payoff equals zero by the first-order condition, and  
   
  rij* = (µ + ψ(Ri) − β)/2α. 
 
The first order condition indicates that individuals choose how much recognition 
to provide by balancing the marginal material benefit, the marginal psychic benefit, and 
the marginal cost of human recognition provision.  The model assumes ψ’ is positive, 
so the marginal payoff of providing positive human recognition increases in one’s own 









i ijR r ∂
Ψ ∂
2
 = ψ’(Ri) > 0.   
   
Furthermore, the magnitude of the human recognition one provides to others depends 
on one’s own level of human recognition.  Higher levels of positive recognition lead one 
to provide less negative recognition (for situations and parameters with positive Ri and 
negative rij) or greater positive recognition (for situations with positive Ri and positive 
rij).  Greater magnitudes of negative recognition lead one to provide greater amounts of 
negative recognition (for situations and parameters with negative Ri and negative rij) or 26 
 
less positive recognition (for situations with negative Ri and positive rij). 
We know from the determinants of Ri, 
Ri = f(
r i r ,  i r ) = f(
r i r +  i r ),  where  









that an individual’s own level of recognition, Ri, depends on the levels of human 
recognition others provide to her, rhi.  Combined with the result from the above 
comparative static, this suggests there is complementarity in provision of human 
recognition.  Individual i’s decision about how much human recognition to provide to j, 
rij, directly affects j’s level of recognition, Rj, which in turn directly and positively affects 








  > 0.   
 
This complementarity is the result of an externality in recognition provision:  
when i provides recognition to j, it affects the recognition j will provide to k and l, but i 
does not include this result of his action when determining how much human recognition 
to provide to others.  The complementarity occurs in both positive and negative 
directions.  Greater positive magnitudes of rij increase the benefits to j of providing 
greater positive magnitudes (or smaller negative magnitudes) of human recognition to 
others, rjk; greater negative magnitudes of rij increase the benefits to j of providing greater 
negative magnitudes (or smaller positive magnitudes) of recognition to others, rjk. 
Depending on the properties of the reaction curves between rij and rjk, this 
complementarity may result in multiple equilibria.  That is, there can be situations with 
both a stable low-level equilibrium in which members of a group of interacting 
individuals mostly provide negative recognition to others, and a stable high-level 27 
 
equilibrium in which people mostly provide positive recognition to others.  An 
equilibrium with low magnitudes of recognition provision (i.e. neutral) may also exist. 
In a case of continuous actions such as human recognition provision, if we assume 
identical agents
4, multiple equilibria will occur if the reaction curve for human 
recognition provision cuts the 45
o line at an interior point with a slope greater than one 
(Hoff 2001).  While the parameters µ, α, β and the function ψ(Ri) vary across individuals 
and interactions, multiple equilibria can exist for a given set of parameters corresponding 
to a set of individuals and interactions.  Figure 2 depicts such a case of multiple equilibria 
with a graph of an individual’s (j’s) reaction curve for provision of human recognition.  
Higher magnitudes of positive (negative) human recognition provided by i lead j to 
provide higher magnitudes of positive (negative) human recognition. 
Three equilibria exist in Figure 2 (Q, R, and S).  Q is a stable equilibrium in which 
people provide negative recognition to each other, S is a stable equilibrium in which 
people provide positive recognition to each other, and R is an unstable equilibrium in 
which people provide neutral recognition to each other. 
 
 
                                                 
4 The assumption of identical agents means differences among individuals’ reactions to others’ recognition 
provision based on one’s place in the social or economic heirarchy or on other characteristics are not 
explicitly considered.  One way to interpret this assumption is to view individuals i and j as “representative 
agents” for the population. 28 
 
Figure 2:  Reaction Curve for Human Recognition Provision  
 
              rjk 
                       S 
                        
                   
                   
 
 
                 R         45
o                
                         rij 
 
 
       
                    
     
       
              Q     
 
                
The graph depicts diminishing marginal reaction to the magnitude of recognition 
received; that is, individual j’s choice of human recognition provision is more sensitive to 
the quantity of recognition provided to her the closer recognition provision is to zero.  At 
higher magnitudes of recognition provision, changes in others’ behavior have less of an 
effect on one’s own recognition provision behavior.  For the model of recognition 
provision described above, diminishing marginal reaction would occur when the function 
ψ(Ri) is of a similar form to the f(r) function discussed in the previous section.  
Diminishing marginal reaction is a necessary condition for the type of multiple equilibria 
depicted in Figure 2.  This is a reasonable property for this function to have because 
recognition provision decisions are likely to be more affected by others’ behavior at 29 
 
moderate or neutral levels of recognition than at extreme values, when one’s behavior 
may be more entrenched.  For example, consider a 70-year-old prisoner who has been 
dehumanized and provided high magnitudes of negative recognition for 40 years, and 
consider his 20-year-old grandson who is not a prisoner and receives a combination of 
positive and negative recognition from those surrounding him.  It is expected that a given 
input of recognition received in the current time period would be less likely to change the 
70-year-old prisoner’s own recognition provision behavior than it would be to change his 
grandson’s.   
Complementarity in the model is based on psychic components of utility, 




Those with greater positive (negative) recognition obtain greater psychic utility from 
providing positive (negative) recognition to others.  However, material factors can 
reinforce this complementarity: once low (high) recognition provision becomes the norm 
it may be materially costly to provide high (low) levels of recognition to others.  For 
example, if all employers apply inhumane employee conditions in factories, an employer 
who tries to provide better conditions and benefits may increase costs and lose his 
competitive edge.  Conversely, once high recognition provision becomes the norm, an 
employer may lose employees if he provides negative recognition to employees through 
poorer conditions, a case that Section V explores more formally.   
Existence of multiple equilibria can contribute to understanding the persistence of 
inefficiencies in human recognition and resulting behaviors.  Based on a study of 
domestic violence in households in southern India and its relationship to intra-household 
resource allocation, Rao concludes: 
 30 
 
  Clearly everyone in a violent household would be better off with the  
same allocation and without the violence.  Why then does violence exist?   
No theoretical model of intra-household behavior, that I am aware of,  
allows for inefficient equilibria.  (Rao 1998) 
   
Multiple equilibria in human recognition may explain this situation. The households Rao 
studied are stuck at equilibrium Q in Figure 2 in a sort of low recognition trap.  It would 
be more beneficial for them to be at equilibrium S with positive recognition and no 
violence, but they are stuck at Q.  Since recognition behavior affects other behaviors and 
outcomes – in Rao’s case intrahousehold resource allocation, as well as possibly health 
outcomes related to violence – remaining at equilibrium Q has implications for these 
outcomes as well. 
In cases where equilibria Q, R, and S are Pareto ranked, a coordination failure will 
exist.  Coordination failure in this context could involve a household in which disrespect 
and abuse are the norm, or a community in which people provide low levels of human 
recognition to each other in schools, health care facilities, and places of employment.  
Complementarity keeps everyone at equilibrium Q through a combination of psychic 
components of utility (
i ijR r ∂
Ψ ∂
2
), conditioning and role modeling, and human recognition’s 
effect on material components of utility as mentioned above and formally modeled in 
Section IV.  Everyone would be better off at equilibrium S, but an individual’s utility 
declines if she provides greater positive recognition (i.e. moves toward S) while everyone 
else is providing negative recognition (at Q).  If someone starts moving up the reaction 
curve from Q, she reacts to the behavior of others by providing greater magnitudes of 
negative recognition and slides back to Q.  Therefore, everyone remains at the low 
equilibrium. 31 
 
  However, if some individuals – such as those at the top of the power structure – 
benefit from being at equilibrium Q and would lose utility if everyone shifted to 
equilibrium S, then strictly speaking this is not a case of coordination failure.  In this case 
the equilibria are not Pareto ranked, and it may not be a failure to coordinate that is 
keeping the population at the low equilibria, but rather deliberate efforts or resistance to 
change on the part of those who would lose utility from such a shift.  For example, in the 
household Rao describes, his premise is that “everyone in a violent household would be 
better off with the same allocation and without the violence”.  But if the provision of 
negative human recognition and the violence influence the allocation of consumption 
goods in the household – for example, through extraction of greater dowry or control of 
household income – then some individuals – perhaps an abused woman’s husband and 
his parents – materially gain from the violence and negative recognition.  In this case it is 
not a coordination failure. Removing the violence is not a Pareto improvement because 
some members will lose goods, and it is not lack of coordination that is preventing 
removal of the violence but rather active efforts on the part of those at the top of the 
household’s power structure.  
  In cases of coordination failure (and possibly in cases of multiple equilibria 
without coordination failure such as the household situation described above), external 
interventions can help move the population from the low equilibrium to the high 
equilibrium.  Depending on the context, interventions may include:  1) issuing and 
enforcing specific laws (e.g. laws regarding labor conditions, domestic violence, 
minimum standards of privacy and care at health care facilities); and/or 2) 
implementation of programs that provide substantial positive recognition to a significant 32 
 
proportion of the population, thereby raising recognition levels high enough that it 
becomes beneficial for people to provide positive recognition to others, i.e. moving the 
population past point R and into quadrant 1 of Figure 2.  Incorporation of human 
recognition components into the design of programs and policies is formally modeled in 
section VI below.  In addition to external interventions, opportunities may also exist for 
internal mechanisms – such as mothers groups or worker solidarity movements – to help 
move populations from a low equilibrium to a high one. 
Note that despite the complementarity in human recognition provision, the 
analysis of an individual’s choice of how much human recognition to provide to others 
ignores the “feedback” psychic effect on one’s own receipt of human recognition that 
provision of recognition to others will have.  That is, rij affects Rj, Rj affects rji, which in 
turn affects Ri.  But this effect is not included in the expression for the optimal level of 
recognition one provides to others, which is derived from the first order condition:  rij* = 
(µ + ψ(Ri) − β)/2α. 
There are two reasons for ignoring this feedback effect in modeling the 
determinants of human recognition provision.  First, it is assumed that an individual 
interacts with large enough populations m and n that the effect of such feedback on any 
given decision an individual makes about providing human recognition to another 
individual is likely to be relatively small.  Second, in many contexts individuals have the 
greatest influence on human recognition levels of those less powerful than themselves.  
As discussed elsewhere (Castleman 2011), recognition tends to move down the pecking 
order, from the more powerful to the less powerful.  Therefore, the people whose 
recognition an individual most influences may not have a strong influence on her own 33 
 
recognition levels; when i determines how much recognition to provide to j, then j may 
be able to influence k and l who are lower in the social or power hierarchy, but j may not 
be able to significantly affect i’s recognition level in response. 
This dynamic clearly depends on the context and on cultural and other factors.  
There may be changes in power structures due to upward or downward mobility, though 
depending on the timeframe for these changes, individuals may not change their 
recognition provision behavior in anticipation of an altered power structure.  In some 
cases, human recognition provided among peers is a primary source of recognition, and 
the feedback effect may apply to small groups of peers such as spouses with relatively 
equal power, small cooperatives, or women’s groups.  Furthermore, in some situations 
strong positive peer-to-peer human recognition transactions can be a catalyst for 
development such as solidarity movements or women’s self-help groups.  Such cases can 
be important opportunities and targets for programs and policies.  While the model 
assumes a more traditional, hierarchical power structure and does not explicitly account 
for this type of feedback effect, the model could be extended to incorporate such an 
effect. 
 
IV. Contribution of Human Recognition to Utility 
  A variety of types of utility function can be used to model human recognition’s 
contribution to utility.  This section uses a simple model in which an individual’s utility is 
determined by consumption, health, human recognition level, and human recognition 
provided to others.  The next section incorporates human recognition into a simple labor 
supply model, illustrating how human recognition’s effect on specific economic 34 
 
behaviors can be modeled.    
Consider a utility function given by  
 
Ui = U(hi, ci, Ri,
p i R ) 
 
where hi is individual i’s health status, ci is her consumption, Ri is her level of human 
recognition, and 
p i R  is the level of human recognition she provides to others, i.e. the net 
total of all the rij’s, 







For simplicity and since there are not individual-specific interactions in this part 
of the model, the i subscripts are dropped, and the utility function becomes  
U = U(h, c, R, Rp) 
where R is an individual’s level of human recognition and Rp is the level of recognition 
she provides to others.   
Health status and consumption are determined by the functions 
  h = h(H, R) and c = c(C, R, Rp) 
where H and C are factors and inputs other than human recognition that determine health 
status and consumption respectively, e.g. household income, age, proximity to health 
facilities, etc.  Note that there may be interactions between H and R because one’s level 
of human recognition can affect access to health services or nutritious food or affect 
adherence to behaviors that determine health status, and conversely some of these factors 
can affect recognition levels.  Similarly, there may be interactions between C and R and 
between C and Rp.  The Rp term is included as part of the argument in the c(..) function 
because the level of human recognition provided to others can affect one’s own 
consumption level.  For example, Bloch and Rao find that systematic domestic violence 35 
 
in southern India – a manifestation of a husband’s negative human recognition of his wife 
– is used to extract dowry payments from the wife’s family, which increases the 
husband’s wealth and consumption (Bloch and Rao 2002).  The Rp term is not included in 
the h(…) function because the direct impact recognition provision has on one’s own 
health is expected to be minimal, though in some cases it could affect mental health. 
Rp represents the total recognition an individual provides to all others, 1…m, and 
its effect on the individual’s utility is determined directly from the payoff function 
derived earlier.  The individual payoff function, πi(rij) = µrij + rijψ(Ri) − αrij
2 − βrij, can be 
converted to a payoff function for total recognition provided, π( Rp) = µRp + Rpψ(R) 
− αRp
2 − βRp.  For simplicity, the parameters, µ, ψ, α, and β, in this function are taken to 
be the same for all m individuals, or alternatively can be interpreted as the sum or the 
average of parameters across all m individuals. 
The payoff function, π(Rp) = µRp + Rpψ(R) − αRp
2 − βRp, is a subutility function.  
Although one’s own recognition level R is a variable in the subutility function, since R is 
not a choice variable in an individual’s utility maximization and can be treated as 
exogenous, two-stage maximization can be used whereby an individual chooses how 
much recognition to provide others and then chooses his other choice variables related to 
consumption and health (Varian 1992).  Optimizing this subutility function as described 
in the previous section yields Rp* = (µ + ψ(R) − β)/2α. 
Incorporating the determinants of each component and the optimal level of human 
recognition provision, the utility function becomes:      
U = U[h(H, R), c(C, R, {µ + ψ(R)− β}/2α), R, (µ + ψ(R) − β)/2α]. 
5 
                                                 
5 An individual’s level of recognition, R, could also be expressed as a function of c, h, and other factors d, 
R(c, h, d), to indicate that consumption and health determine the level of recognition an individual receives.  36 
 
Resource constraints could be added to generate a constrained maximization 
problem for the individual, such as an expenditure constraint on H and C.  Since the focus 
of this section is on human recognition’s overall contribution to utility, constrained utility 
maximization problems are not included.  In Section VI, we add resource constraints 
associated with a development program to examine a program’s maximization problem.  
Because individual maximization problems are not explored here, there is no need to 
incorporate the R = f(r) function into this part of the model. 
A simple linear function, u(R) = φR, is used for the direct psychic effect one’s 
human recognition level has on one’s utility, with φ > 0.    Using a simple additive utility 
function, the utility function becomes: 
U = U[h(H, R), c(C, R, Rp), R, Rp] 
     = uh[h(H, R)] + uc[c(C, R, Rp)] + φR + π(Rp) 
where uh and uc are utility functions for health and consumption. 
A simple linear function, ψ(R) = ψR, is used for the marginal psychic benefit of 
human recognition provision, with ψ > 0.  Recalling that Rp* = {µ + ψ(R)− β}/2α,  
the subutility of human recognition provision is now given by the expression,  
π(Rp) = µRp + RpψR − αRp
2 − βRp.  
The utility function becomes: 
U = uh[h(H, R)] + uc[c(C, R, {µ + ψR− β}/2α)] + φR + µ{µ + ψR− β}/2α + 
ψR{µ + ψR − β}/2α − α({µ + ψR − β}/2α)
2 − β{µ + ψR − β}/2α. 
                                                                                                                                                 
This is hypothesized to be a simultaneous relationship, with recognition determining health and 
consumption as well.  However, since the result of interest here is the effect that changes in recognition 





, including such a functional relationship in this model does not enrich the results.   
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 + φ +  (µ − β + ψR). 
Derivation of the last term of this expression is given in Appendix 1. 
This expression indicates that one’s level of human recognition affects well-being 





















 (material effects); b) through its direct effect on well-being, φ 
(psychic effects); and c) through its effect on the recognition one provides to others, 




(µ − Β + ψR) (psychic and material effects).   
  Three results emerge from the model for empirical testing:   










, the effects of human recognition on 
health and consumption.  Both are hypothesized to be positive. 
2)  The significance and sign of φ, the direct psychic effect of human recognition on 
utility.  It is hypothesized to be positive. 





, the total effect of human recognition on utility.  
It is hypothesized to be positive. 





(µ − β + ψR), in the marginal utility expression is negative and of greater 





individual’s utility of the change in his provision of recognition to others that is caused 
by a change in his own level of recognition.  Using notation, this effect can be expressed 
as: 
∆R      ∆Rp     ∆U   
This term will be negative if and only if Rp is negative.  This can be seen by 




(µ − β + ψR), is the same as the sign of the 
optimal level of recognition provided to others, Rp* = {µ + ψR − β}/2α.
6   
When this term is negative, there are two cases to consider.  The first case is an 
individual who is providing negative recognition, Rp, and whose own recognition level, 
R, increases.  Because of complementarity, the increase in R leads the individual to 
decrease the magnitude of negative recognition he is providing others.  This may 
decrease the (psychic and/or material) utility the person obtains from providing negative 
recognition to others.  So the rise in the individual’s recognition level decreases the utility 
obtained from provision of recognition and hence the final term in the marginal utility 
expression is negative.   
However, in terms of the individual’s total utility, in most of these cases the 
magnitude of the increase in utility from the increased recognition level (due to improved 
health, increased consumption, and psychic benefits) will be larger than the magnitude of 
                                                 






∂ ) ( π
 = µ + ψRi − 2αrij − β = 0.  Given this condition, if µ − β + ψRi < 0, then rij < 0.  And in order for 




(µ − β + ψR), to be negative, µ − β + ψRi 
must be negative.   39 
 
the decrease in utility due to the change in recognition provision.  That is, even if 


















 + φ > | (µ − β + ψR)|.  
Furthermore, in terms of total social welfare, while providing less negative 
recognition may reduce the individual provider’s utility, it will increase the utility of the 
individuals who receive the lower quantities of negative recognition.  So while there may 
be a private loss of utility to the provider due to the reduced magnitude of negative 
recognition provision, there is likely a net social gain.  This has implications for the 
benefits of interventions aimed at increasing provision of positive recognition and 
decreasing provision of negative recognition, though of course this is distinct from 
whether individual utility increases or decreases.  
The second case is similar and involves an individual who is providing negative 
recognition to others, Rp, and whose own recognition level, R, decreases.  The decrease 
in R leads the individual to provide a higher magnitude of negative recognition to others, 
which may increase the (psychic and/or material) utility the individual obtains from 
providing recognition to others.  So the decrease in the individual’s recognition level 
increases the utility obtained from provision of negative recognition and hence the final 
term in the marginal utility expression is negative.   
Again, in terms of the individual’s total utility, it is unlikely that the magnitude of 
this increase in utility will be equal to or greater than the magnitude of the decrease in 
utility caused by the decline in the individual’s own level of recognition.  That is, it is 






























And again, in terms of social welfare, while the increase in utility caused by 
greater negative provision of recognition would be a private gain, it would likely 
represent a social loss given the decreased utility of those on the receiving end of the 
negative recognition. 
Therefore, for all practical purposes, we assume that if hypotheses 1) and 2) both 
hold, then hypothesis 3) will hold also.  However, with suitable measurement techniques 
and data, this assumption can be tested by empirically testing hypothesis 3), a process 
that is begun in another paper (Castleman 2011c).     
Specifying the model further using simple, explicit functional forms for the uh and 
uc functions yields: 
U = ηh + κc + φR + π(Rp), where η, κ > 0.  
The following explicit functional forms are then used for the h and c functions:  
h = h(H, R) = H + 
λ
HR
 + σR, where H > 0, σ > 0 and λ > R’.  
c = c(H, R, Rp) = C + 
γ
CR
+ δR + θRp - τRp, where C > 0, γ > R’, δ > 0, θ > 0,  
τ < 1. 
The σR and δR terms represent the direct effects one’s recognition level has on 
health and consumption.  For example, recognition levels may affect mental and 
emotional health status. 
The θRp and τRp terms represent the positive and negative effects, respectively, 
that provision of human recognition has on one’s own consumption.  These parameters 
are related to µ, α, and β, the parameters for the material benefits and costs of human 
recognition provision, but they are not identical to those parameters because recognition 41 
 
provision may generate other material benefits and costs in addition to those related to 
consumption (e.g. political power within the community, or changes in health). 
  R’ is the upper bound of the scale used to measure R and the inverse of the lower 







 terms represent the effects that one’s human recognition level 
has on the “productivity” of other factors in producing health and consumption 
respectively.  For example, if one component of H is proximity to health care facilities, 
an individual with a higher level of human recognition may obtain greater health benefits 
from living a given distance from health facilities than an individual with a lower level of 
recognition.  Greater recognition from family members may enable an individual to visit 
the facility more freely; greater recognition from health care providers at the facility may 
encourage more frequent attendance and better adherence to treatment provided and 
practices recommended.  The restriction on the parameters λ and γ that they are greater 
than the maximum level of R and the inverse of the minimum level of R means that the 
effect these interactions between recognition and other factors have on health and 
consumption will always be smaller in magnitude than the direct effect that non-
recognition factors, H and C, have on health and consumption.  The expressions for 
health and consumption can be rewritten as 
h = H(1 + 
λ
R
) + σR 
  c = C(1 + 
λ
R




| < 1, the effect of the interactive terms is to enhance or diminish the impacts H 42 
 
and C have on health and consumption, not to supercede or eliminate these impacts. 
  Incorporating these explicit functions, the additive utility function becomes: 
U = η(H + 
λ
HR
 + σR) + κ(C + 
γ
CR
 + δR + θRp - τRp) + φR + π(Rp). 
Substituting the optimized level of recognition provision and the subutility function 
yields: 
U = η(H + 
λ
HR
 + σR) + κ(C + 
γ
CR
 + δR + 
α
β ψ µ τ θ
2
) )( ( − + − R
) + φR +  
µ{µ + ψR− β}/2α + ψR {µ + ψR− β}/2α − α({µ + ψR− β}/2α)
2 − β{µ + ψR− 
β}/2α 








 + σ) + κ(
γ
C





) + φ +  (µ − β + ψR). 
The same three results emerge from the model, now with specific functional forms that 























) > 0. 
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.  That is, it requires that the negative marginal effect that provision of 
recognition has on one’s own consumption, τ, be significantly greater than the positive marginal effect, θ, 





be of greater magnitude than the sum of the marginal 
effect one’s own level of recognition has on one’s consumption and the marginal effect one’s own human 
recognition level has on the productivity of other consumption factors, 
γ
C
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) + φ +  (µ − β + ψR) > 0.  
The same factors apply for signing the last term of the expression in (3) as were 
discussed above for the general function. 
As in the general case, these three results suggest that increases in one’s level of 
human recognition improve utility through both direct (psychic) and indirect (material) 
channels and improve health and consumption outcomes.  With suitable measurement 
methods and data (Castleman 2011b; Castleman 2011c), these three results can be 
empirically tested. 
 
V. Role of Human Recognition in Labor Supply 
  Human recognition is relevant to the workplace, especially in developing country 
contexts where wide ranges of working conditions and employee treatment norms exist.  
Much of the research on determinants of women’s labor supply in developing countries 
has focused on factors such as women’s education levels, household income and wealth, 
husbands’ education levels, cultural mores, and opportunity costs in terms of household 
and own-farm production, child care and other household duties (Cameron et al. 2001; 
Fafchamps and Quisumbing 1998; Fafchamps and Quisumbing 1999; Khandker 1988; 
Mammen and Paxson 2000).  These factors are external to the nature of the employment 
itself.  Yet job characteristics can also affect labor supply, the most obvious characteristic 
being wage levels.  Other, non-wage characteristics of a job that affect labor supply 
decisions are often combined into the concept of “job satisfaction” and include 





environment, social interactions at the workplace, the job’s effect on social status within 
one’s community, and indirect opportunities to gain social or economic benefits such as 
increasing the chances that other household members obtain employment. 
It is posited that human recognition transactions at the workplace are a relevant 
characteristic that contributes to job satisfaction.  Employees receive positive or negative 
human recognition through working conditions and employer treatment of employees, 
such as the physical working environment, availability of basic facilities, policies and 
norms for sick or hurt employees, disciplinary policies and actions, and gifts or bonuses 
that help to meet employees’ basic needs.  Since these factors affect employees’ well-
being (through both material and psychic channels), it is hypothesized that they also 
affect labor supply decisions.  For example, a woman who is generally treated 
disrespectfully or even abusively in her household but who is treated with respect and 
dignity at her workplace may choose to spend more time on the job (for a given wage and 
income level) than if she were treated poorly on the job. 
A simple static labor supply model is adapted to incorporate human recognition as 
a factor that influences labor supply decisions.  The adapted model generates a testable 
hypothesis about the relationship between the level of human recognition an individual 
receives at the workplace and the individual’s labor supply.  The model can be used, for 
example, to describe labor supply decisions of women in developing country contexts. 
Because this is a labor supply model, it requires a somewhat different 
parameterization than the earlier general utility model.  Utility is given by the function 
  Ui = U(ci, Li, Ri) 
where Li is time individual i spends not working in the labor market (i.e. time not spent 45 
 
working for remuneration from employers outside of one’s own household), and ci and Ri 
are consumption and total level of recognition respectively as in the earlier model.  The 
utility function is increasing in all three arguments.  Since interactions among specific 
individuals are not part of the model, the subscripts are dropped for simplicity to become 
U = U(c, L, R).   
L satisfies the constraint K = H + L, where K is the total time available and H is 
time spent in market work.  R is determined by a function R = R(R , K, L), where R is 
the level of recognition one receives from sources other than the workplace. 
In this model the R function is specified as R = R + (K-L)r, where r is the 
quantity of human recognition an individual receives at work per time unit of labor.  That 
the level of human recognition is proportional to the hours one works makes intuitive 
sense.  For example, a given workplace practice that affects one’s level of human 
recognition is likely to have a greater effect on an employee who spends 40 hours per 
week at the workplace than one who spends only 10 hours per week there.  
  Workers face the following problem: 
 
  max U(c, L, R) subject to  1) W(K-L) + N > Pc 
          2) R = r(K-L) + R , such that R∈[0, 2) 
          3) K = H + L 
 
where W is the wage, N is the individual’s non-labor income, and P is the price of 
consumption. 
An explicit functional form for utility is used to solve the optimization problem 
and generate comparative statics with meaningful interpretations.   
U = αlog(c) + βlog(L) + γlog(R),   α, β, γ > 0, R∈[0,2). 46 
 
In this model an individual’s level of human recognition is bounded by 0 and 2.
8  
Human recognition levels between 1 and 2 mean an individual has positive net human 
recognition, from which she derives positive utility.  Human recognition levels between 0 
and 1 mean an individual has negative net human recognition, from which she derives 
disutility.  A human recognition value of 1 represents “neutral” net human recognition 
from which an individual derives neither positive nor negative utility.  This could be 
viewed as shifting Figure 1 up so that a lower asymptote is at R = 0, an upper asymptote 
is at R = 2, and the inflection point is at R = 1.  However, for simplicity in the labor 
supply model, the R = f(r) function is not used; instead total recognition is equal to 
recognition received on the job, r(K-L), and off the job, R , but is bounded between 0 and 
2. 
The worker’s utility maximization problem becomes: 
   max U = αlog(c) + βlog(L) + γlog(R)   s.t. W(K-L) + N > Pc  
(c, L, R)          R = r(K-L) + R  
            K = H + L 
 
Substituting K – H for L yields the following Lagrangean: 
 
   max   L = αlog(c) + βlog(K-H) + γlog(R) + λ(WH + N - Pc) + µ(rH + R - R)      
(c, H, R) 
 
The price of consumption goods is normalized to 1, and the first order conditions 
become: 











                                                 
8 This implies that while r can be positive, negative, or zero, R is also bound between 0 and 2.  47 
 




4.  λ:   c N WH = +  
5.  µ:   + rH R = R 
 
Combining the five first order conditions from a worker’s utility maximization 














This condition is derived in Appendix 2.  From this equation, the effect on labor supply 
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 > 0.  
Derivation of this comparative static is given in Appendix 2. 
This result suggests that increases in human recognition provided at the 
workplace lead to increases in labor supply.  This is an example of human recognition 
affecting economic behavior through a hedonic market mechanism (Castleman 2011).  
This can be tested empirically if data are available on both measurable variations in the 
levels of recognition provided at workplaces and variations in labor supply at these 
workplaces. 
 
VI.  Programs and Policies 
  The model can be extended to describe development programs and policies.  
Programs and policies influence human recognition levels, which in turn can affect the 
utility of the target population through recognition’s direct psychic effects, recognition’s 
effects on materials outcomes that are part of the program’s objectives, and recognition’s 48 
 
effects on other material outcomes.  Whether and how human recognition is considered in 
program design and allocation of resources can influence program outcomes for targeted 
beneficiaries.  Furthermore, complementarity in human recognition suggests that 
programs can also affect the human recognition levels of populations that are not direct 
program beneficiaries.   
The model in this section examines how consideration of human recognition 
factors in the design of a health program affects resource allocation and outcomes.  
Similar models could be applied to programs in other sectors, e.g. microcredit or 
education.  The model focuses on a program, but could be adapted to apply either more 
broadly to policies or more narrowly to specific services.   
In the model a program maximizes a welfare function for a targeted population
9:  
R H W
, max  =  i
q
i w Σ , wi = Ui(h(H0, H, R0, R), r(R0, R))  
= η[H0 + H + 
λ
) )( ( 0 0 R R H H + +
 + σ(R0 + R)] + φ(R0 + R)   
subject to HpH + RpR < M, 
where there are q members of the targeted population; wi is the welfare of individual i; H0 
are pre-existing health-related factors that are not the result of program interventions; H 
are program interventions aimed at improving health; R0 are pre-existing recognition-
related factors that are not the result of program interventions
10; R are program 
interventions that directly target recognition; pH and pR are the costs of health and 
                                                 
9 Depending on the program, the target population may be either direct program beneficiaries or the entire 
population in the program catchment area. 
10 These non-program factors are known or estimated by the program designers or managers in that they are 
considered in resource allocation choices. 49 
 
recognition interventions respectively; and M is the level of resources available to the 
program.  Parameters µ, τ, σ, and φ are interpreted as described earlier with the same 
restrictions on their values. 
The model assumes a homogenous target population, and H0, H, R0, and R 
represent levels for the entire population
11.  The utility function uses the r(R0, R) = (R0 + 
R) to express an individual’s level of human recognition under the simplifying 
assumption that recognition outcomes are directly proportional to pre-existing factors and 
program investments targeting recognition.  Similarly, (H0 + H) is used to express non-
recognition factors affecting health.  In this model, H0, H, R0, and R are all confined to be 
non-negative because the model examines program inputs to improve health and human 
recognition, and because allowing negative values poses problems for the budget 
constraint, i.e., pH and pR refer to the prices for interventions aimed at improving health 
and recognition respectively, not explicit savings or profits from reducing health or 
recognition levels.  Therefore, the lowest levels of health, recognition, or utility in the 
model is 0.   
The objective function is a utilitarian welfare function:  utility is determined by 
the sum of beneficiaries’ utilities.  Alternatively, a Rawlsian welfare function (minmax of 
utilities) or another type of welfare function could be used.  The main conclusions about 
treatment of human recognition in programs would still hold, though the expressions and 
comparative statics would differ.  Other components may be added to either the objective 
function or the constraints, such as implementing organizations’ institutional priorities or 
donor requirements, but the model assumes the program’s primary objective is 
                                                 
11 Alternatively, the variables could represent averages for a heterogeneous population. 50 
 
improvement of beneficiary utility and the primary constraint is a resource constraint. 
Note that the program’s objectives are limited to particular components of utility, 
specifically health and recognition levels.  The contribution to utility of consumption is 
not included in the utility function, as it is assumed that health programs focus on 
improved well-being of beneficiaries brought about by changes in health, not 
consumption.  There is evidence of a strong positive relationship between consumption 
and health (see Feachem et al., 1992), and some health programs do consider 
consumption implications in program interventions, but this model is confined to the 
program’s specific health and recognition objectives.  There have been recent efforts to 
identify multidimensional measures of poverty and deprivation (Alkire and Foster 2011) 
and to design multisectoral program approaches (Sanchez et al. 2007).  If broader utility 
and welfare functions that include consumption and other components were used in the 
model, it would make the solutions more complicated but is not expected to change the 
main conclusions about human recognition. 
Beneficiaries’ human recognition levels are included as an argument in the 
program’s objective function because health programs can influence recognition levels, 
which in turn affect utility through changes in health outcomes, as well as directly 
through psychic components of utility.  Applying the terminology Sen uses to describe 
freedom’s role in development (Sen 1999), human recognition impacts utility through 
both instrumental effects as it influences health and constitutive effects as it influences 
well-being directly.  Provision of recognition, Rp, is not included in the utility function 
because an individual’s provision of recognition is not likely to significantly affect one’s 
own health.  Beneficiaries’ provision of recognition is relevant to health programs insofar 51 
 
as it affects other beneficiaries’ recognition levels, but this is captured in the R0 + R term, 
the expression for beneficiary recognition levels. 
Because of the complementarity in recognition provision discussed earlier, 
program investment in improving recognition levels may lead to changes in recognition 
for a wider population than those directly receiving program interventions.  Programs can 
enhance these “spread effects” with outreach efforts, such as by supporting program 
beneficiaries to lead farmers groups, mothers groups, health education sessions, or 
microfinance groups, which may help extend both the material and human recognition 
benefits of the program.  In some contexts strengthening peer-to-peer human recognition 
can contribute to development outcomes, such as through solidarity movements or 
women’s groups that facilitate improved human recognition transactions, empower 
members, and these opportunities can help spread program benefits beyond direct 
beneficiaries. 
The model includes the use of distinct resources (RpR) to improve beneficiaries’ 
human recognition levels.  While in some cases, this may involve specific additional 
interventions such as pycho-social counseling or interventions to reduce domestic 
violence, in many cases these efforts will not involve separate interventions, but rather 
spending additional resources on existing health interventions to ensure they produce 
positive or non-negative recognition outcomes.  Examples of such efforts include refining 
the content and methods of staff training, norms for the amount of time service providers 
spend with clients, supervision content and methods, or infrastructure such as beneficiary 
seating.  In addition to these interventions, there may also be relatively costless ways that 
programs can enhance human recognition simply by adjusting how health interventions 52 
 
are implemented, such as changes in interpersonal behavior among service providers and 
other program staff.  These adjustments may not require significant resources, though 
training and structured supervision and support systems may ensure higher quality and 
sustained changes.  While some such “win-win” opportunities do exist to improve 
recognition and health simultaneously without significantly affecting the resources 
allocated to either, the model focuses on cases that invovle choices in resource allocation. 
Case 1:  Direct and instrumental effects of human recognition considered (optimal 
program) 
  The optimal program faces the following constrained optimization problem: 
R H W
, max  =  i
q
i w Σ , wi = Ui(h(H0, H, R0, R), r(R0, R))  
= η[H0 + H + 
λ
) )( ( 0 0 R R H H + +
 + σ(R0 + R)] + φ(R0 + R)   
subject to HpH + RpR < M 
  A program that solves this problem, accounting for recognition’s direct effects on 
utility and its indirect effects through health outcomes, solves the following Lagrangian: 
R H, maxL  = η[H0 + H + 
λ
) )( ( 0 0 R R H H + +
 + σ(R0 + R)] + φ(R0 + R) + Λ(M - HpH – RpR). 
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= M - HpH – RpR = 0  53 
 
Solving these conditions yields the following optimal levels of investment in health and 
recognition (the derivation of this solution is given in Appendix 3): 












































Comparative statics indicate that for the program, health and recognition 


































, and that health and recognition interventions act as 



























Comparative statics also indicate that better initial health factors and status 
(higher H0) leads to relatively lower investments in the direct health aspects of 
interventions and relatively higher investments in recognition; and better initial 
recognition status (higher R0) leads to relatively lower investments in recognition aspects 
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  Hence, while H and R are substitutes in the standard 
economic sense, they are also complementary products that enhance each other’s 
contribution to utility.  Because of the positive interaction between recognition and health 
inputs in the health component of the utility function, higher levels of health (recognition) 
increase the marginal utility from improvements in recognition (health).  This implies 
that programs should aim to balance their investments across health and recognition, 
taking into account the pre-program status.      
For the welfare and utility functions given, these outcomes represent the optimal 
situation in which program design accounts for human recognition both as a direct 
component of utility and as a contributing factor to health outcomes, which leads to the 
maximum utility and welfare levels.  We now look at outcomes for programs that either 
do not consider human recognition or only partially account for it in program design. 
Case 2:  Human recognition not considered 
  A program that does not consider human recognition at all in program design 
solves a variation of the above optimization problem in which no R terms are included.  
The program solves the following Lagrangian: 
 
H L max  = η(H0 + H) + Λ(M - HpH) 
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The solution is H** =
H p
M
.  Since recognition is not considered in the design, 
there are no investments made directly in recognition, and R** = 0.  Note this does not 
mean the program will not have an effect on human recognition levels; most programs 
influence recognition levels of the targeted population, even if they are “unintended 
consequences” such as Sen describes (Sen 1999).  What it does mean is that the program 
does not deliberately allocate any resources to specifically improve recognition.  Recall 
the R terms do not refer only to separate interventions for recognition, but also to efforts 
to ensure that health interventions are implemented in a manner that enhances recognition 
levels.  In fact, in some cases programs that focus exclusively on health objectives and 
not at all on human recognition objectives may reduce recognition levels among program 
beneficiaries because what is perceived as the most efficient methods for providing health 
services may involve provision of negative recognition, e.g. coercive family planning 
methods or very brief doctor visits. 
  For the welfare and utility functions used in this model, this outcome is a 
suboptimal resource allocation, and the program is over-investing in the direct health 
aspects of interventions and under-investing in the aspects of interventions aimed at 
improving human recognition.  That is, H** > H* and R** < R*, except for the unusual 
case when R* = 0.  According to the model, beneficiaries of a program providing H** 
and R** will have lower welfare than beneficiaries of a program providing H* and R*. 
Case 3: Human recognition considered but no resources allocated 
  A variation similar to Case 2 is a program that does recognize and consider 
human recognition’s role, but chooses a priori not to devote any resources specifically to 
addressing recognition.  Such a program solves a special case of the optimization 56 
 
problem; there is no R term in the expenditure constraint and there is an additional 
constraint that R = 0.  The program solves the following Lagrangian: 
H L max  = η[H0 + H + 
λ
) )( ( 0 0 R R H H + +
 + σ(R0 + R)] + φ(R0 + R)  + Λ(M-HpH) + Γ(R-0) 
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Γ ∂
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= R = 0 
The solution is the same as above:  H** =
H p
M
 and R** = 0, with the same 
implications for the welfare of targeted beneficiaries. 
Case 4: Only instrumental effects of human recognition considered 
  Many programs do consider human recognition and make allowances for it in 
program design, though they may not use the term, human recognition.  For example, 
health programs may realize that participatory and respectful approaches lead to greater 
attendance at services and better adherence to prescribed treatments and recommended 
behaviors.  The design of such a program may account for the instrumental effect 
recognition has on utility through its effect on health outcomes, but not account for 
recognition’s direct effect on utility. 
Such a program solves a special case of the optimization problem in which there 
is no term for the psychic utility of recognition, φ(R0 + R), or alternatively in which φ = 0.  
The program solves the following Lagrangian:     57 
 
R H, maxL  = η[H0 + H + 
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Solving these conditions yields the following levels of investment in health and 
recognition: 
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  The comparative statics have the same signs as in the optimal case, but this is a 
suboptimal allocation of resources, with overinvestment in the direct health aspects of 
interventions and underinvestment in the recognition aspects of interventions.  With 
recognition’s direct effect on utility not considered in program design, the 
η
φ
 terms are 
no longer in the solutions, and comparison with the the optimal solutions for Case 1 
shows that H*** > H* and R*** < R*.  Again, this will lead to lower beneficiary welfare 
than the optimal case.  
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Case 5: Only direct effects of human recognition considered 
  The last variation involves a program that accounts for human recognition’s direct 
psychic effect on utility, but does not account for its indirect effect through health 
outcomes.  This is a less likely case than Case 4, but may occur in a program that is 
attuned to psychological and emotional aspects of well-being for their own sake but does 
not see a link between these factors and the types of health services the program supports.   
Such a program solves a special case of the above optimization problem in which 
there are no R terms in the expression for beneficiaries’ health.  The program solves the 
following Lagrangian:  
R H, maxL  = η(H0 + H) + φ(R0 + R) + Λ(M - HpH – RpR) 
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, then there are an infinite number of solutions that meet the budget constraint.  
Intuitively, this makes sense because with a linear utility function and linear cost 
structure, if the benefit-cost ratio of health  ) (
H p
η
 is greater than the benefit-cost ratio of 59 
 
recognition  ) (
R p
φ
, all program investment will go to health, and vice versa if the benefit-
cost ratio for recognition is greater.  If the two ratios are equal, then there are infinite 
solutions because any allocation that meets the budget constraint will provide the same 
utility.  Neither of the definite solutions is optimal; one entails over-investing in direct 
health aspects and under-investing in recognition, and the other entails over-investing in 
recognition and under-investing in health.   
 
Development practitioners often report that how a project is implemented is as 
great a factor in its success as the technical content of the activity.  This is one reason for 
recent focus on quality assurance and quality improvement processes in health and other 
programs in developing countries (e.g., USAID Health Care Improvement Project 2008).  
This model suggests that part of that how is whether and how program design accounts 
for human recognition.  Optimal improvements in the utility of the targeted population 
occur when both the direct and instrumental effects of human recognition are considered 
in program design and resource allocation.  When programs do not consider human 
recognition or when they account for only a portion of its effects, suboptimal outcomes 
result.   
 
VII. Conclusions and Areas for Further Study 
One of the challenges of incorporating non-material components of economic 
development into research and practice is the difficulty of modeling the roles these 
components play in development processes and outcomes.  The model presented here 
offers an approach to understanding and predicting the determinants, contribution to 60 
 
utility, and role in programs of one such non-material component - human recognition.  
In addition to the foundation the model lays for further work on human recognition, this 
approach may also be useful for modeling other non-material components of 
development, such as empowerment, social capital, or social exclusion.   
The model predicts a number of hypotheses that can be empirically tested if data 
that validly measure recognition are available.  In particular, the model predicts that 
increases in one’s level of human recognition increase utility through both direct, psychic 
effects and indirect, material effects such as improved health and consumption outcomes.  
Development of an approach for measuring human recognition will enable empirical 
study to better understand several of the issues that emerge from the model, including:  
determinants of human recognition levels, determinants of recognition provision, extent 
to which recognition is a determinant of material development outcomes such as health, 
income and labor supply, extent to which recognition is a determinant of well-being, and 
the impact of specific program interventions on recognition. 
On the theoretical side, there is a need for further study of multiple equilibria of 
human recognition and the role these play in poverty traps.  There is also scope for more 
comprehensive modeling of human recognition transactions among individuals, perhaps 
applying models of social and economic networks (see for instance Jackson and 
Wolinsky 1996). 
One notable feature of the model is that the function that maps received 
recognition to an individual’s total level of recognition increases in its argument but has 
marginal effects that decline for higher absolute values of the argument.  This means that 
a given input of human recognition has less of an effect on individuals who already have 61 
 
very large positive or negative levels of recognition than it does on those with moderate 
or low levels of recognition.  This “insulation” effect also occurs in the model of human 
recognition provision, in which a given input of recognition one receives from others has 
less effect on one’s own recognition provision behavior when one already receives large 
magnitudes of positive or negative recognition.  While these dynamics require greater 
study and empirical validation, they may have implications for policies and programs.  
For example, it may be that while the greatest need for increased receipt of human 
recognition lies with those who receive large magnitudes of low recognition, and the 
greatest scope for improving provision of recognition lies with “middle” groups who do 
not receive large magnitudes of high or low recognition. 
Efforts to improve human recognition levels need to be based on a sound 
understanding of the dynamics of human recognition provision.  The model of human 
recognition provision suggests that in some circumstances, multiple equilibria can exist.  
A community or group of interacting individuals can be stuck at a stable low-level 
equilibrium in which people for the most part provide negative recognition to each other, 
or can be at a stable high-level equilibrium in which people for the most part provide 
positive recognition to each other.  These multiple equilibria may help to explain certain 
situations at household and community levels, and given the hypothesized interactions 
between recognition and material outcomes, groups stuck at a low-level equilibrium 
could be in a sort of low recognition poverty trap.  Policy and program interventions that 
address human recognition may be able to assist such groups escape the traps by helping 
them move to a high-level equilibrium. 
One conclusion that emerges from the model that is of relevance to the design of 62 
 
program interventions is that an exclusively instrumental approach to human recognition 
issues is incomplete.  Only considering the impacts that changes in recognition have on 
individuals’ material outcomes (health, consumption) undervalues recognition’s impact 
by failing to capture its direct impact on well-being.  The model predicts that when 
programs only account for recognition’s role in achieving better health, education, or 
income outcomes and do not consider its direct role in well-being, the resulting program 
design and resource allocations will be suboptimal.  This implies the need to broaden the 
view of human recognition and related non-material components of development from 
being only a means of achieving better material outcomes to also being an objective of 
the same order – though not necessarily of the same priority – as material objectives.  
Such a broadening of perspective suggests that development at its optimum is a process 
of simultaneously improving material and non-material outcomes.  
   63 
 
References 
Alkire, Sabina and James Foster.  “Counting and Multidimensional Poverty 
Measurement.”  Journal of Public Economics.  2011.  Vol. 95: 476-487. 
 
Bloch, Francis and Viyayendra Rao.  “Terror as a Bargaining Instrument: A Case Study 
of Dowry Violence in Rural India”.  American Economic Review.  September 2002. Vol. 
92, No. 4: 1029-1043. 
 
Cahuc, Pierre and Andre Zylberberg.  Labor Economics.  Cambridge, MA:  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004.   
 
Cameron, Lisa A., J. Malcolm Dowling, and Christopher Worswick.  “Education and 
Labor Market Participation of Women in Asia: Evidence from Five Countries”.  
Economic Development and Cultural Change.  April 2001.  Volume 49, No. 3: 459-477.   
 
Castleman, Tony.  “Human Recognition and Its Role in Economic Development: A 
Descriptive Review.”  2011.  The George Washington University. Institute for 
International Economic Policy Working Paper 2011-08. 
 
Castleman, Tony.  “Measurement of Human Recognition:  A Methodology with 
Empirical Applications in India and Kenya.” 2011b. The George Washington University.  
Institute for International Economic Policy Working Paper 2011-10. 
 
Castleman, Tony.  “Human Recognition among HIV-Infected Adults:  Empirical 
Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial in Kenya.” 2011c. The George 
Washington University. Institute for International Economic Policy Working Paper 2011-
11. 
 
Fafchamps, Marcel and Agnes R. Quisumbing.  “Human Capital, Productivity, and Labor 
Allocation in Rural Pakistan”.  Food Consumption and Nutrition Division Discussion 
Paper No. 48.  International Food Policy Research Institute.  July 1998. 
 
Fafchamps, Marcel and Agnes R. Quisumbing.  “Social Roles, Human Capital, and the 
Intrahousehold Division of Labor: Evidence from Pakistan”.  Food Consumption and 
Nutrition Division Discussion Paper No. 73.  International Food Policy Research 
Institute.  September 1999. 
 
The Health of Adults in the Developing World.  Feachem, Richard G A, Tord Kjellstrom, 
Christopher J L Murrary, Mead Over and Margaret A Phillips, eds.  Washington DC: 
World Bank 1992. 
 
Hoff, Karla.  “Beyond Rosenstein-Rodan: The Modern Theory of Coordination Problems 
in Development.”  Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 2000.  
The World Bank, 2001.   
 64 
 
Jackson, Matthew O. and Asher Wolinsky.  “A Strategic Model of Social and Economic 
Networks”.  Journal of Economic Theory.  1996.  Volume 71: 44-74. 
 
Khandker, Shahidur R.  “Determinants of Women’s Time Allocation in Rural 
Bangladesh”.  Economic Development and Cultural Change.  October 1998.  Volume 37, 
No. 1: 111-126. 
 
Leonesio, Michael V.  “In-Kind Transfers and Work Incentives”.  Journal of Labor 
Economics.  October 1988.  Volume 6, No. 4: 515-529. 
 
Lind, E.A. and T.R. Tyler. The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice.  Plenum Press, 
New York, 1988. 
 
Lurie, Melvin.  “The Growth of Fringe Benefits and the Meaning of Wage Setting by 
Wage Comparisons”.  The Journal of Industrial Economics.  November 1966.  Volume 
15, No. 1: 16-25.   
 
Mammen, Kristen and Christina Paxson.  “Women’s Work and Economic Development”.  
The Journal of Economic Perspectives.  Autumn 2000.  Volume 14, No. 4: 141-164. 
 
Oliver, JE.  “Intergenerational transmission of child abuse: rates, research, and clinical 
implications”. American Journal of Psychiatry. 1993. Volume 150: 1315-1324. 
 
Rao, Vijayendra. “Domestic Violence and Intra-Household Resource Allocation in Rural 
India: An Exercise in Participatory Econometrics”.  Chapter 5.  Gender, Population, and 
Development.  M. Krishnaraj, R. Sudarshan, and A. Sharif, eds.  Oxford University Press,  
Oxford and Delhi, 1998. 
 
Sanchez, Cheryl Palm, Jeffrey Sachs, Glenn Denning, Rafael Flor, Rebbie Harawa, 
Bashir Jama, Tsegazeab Kiflemariam, Bronwen Konecky, Raffaela Kozar, Eliud Lelerai,  
Alia Malik, Vijay Modi, Patrick Mutuo, Amadou Niang, Herine Okoth, Frank Place, 
Sonia Ehrlich Sachs, Amir Said, David Siriri, Awash Teklehaimanot, Karen Wang, 
Justine Wangila, and Colleen Zamba. “The African Millennium Villages.” Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences.  October 2007.  Vol. 104, No. 43: 16775-16780.  
 
Sen, Amartya. Development as Freedom.  New York:  Anchor Books (Random House), 
1999. 
 
USAID Health Care Improvement Project. 2008. “The Improvement Collaborative: An 
Approach to Rapidly Improve Health Care and Scale Up Quality Services”. Bethesda, 
MD: University Research Co., LLC (URC). 
 
Varian, Hal.  Microeconomic Analysis.  Third edition.  New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, Inc., 1992.65 
 
 
List of Appendices 
Appendix 1:  Derivation of Marginal Utility of Recognition Level  
Appendix 2:  Derivation of First Order Conditions and Comparative Statics in Labor Model  
 
Appendix 3:  Derivation of Optimal Program Health and Recognition Investments 66 
 
Appendix 1:  Derivation of Marginal Utility of Recognition Level 
 
The general utility function is: 
U = uh[h(H, R)] + uc[c(C, R, Rp)] + φR + π( Rp) 
Substituting for Rp * = {µ + ψR− β}/2α, and π( Rp) = µ Rp + Rp ψRi − α Rp
 2 − β Rp, the utility 
function becomes: 
U = uh[h(H, R)] + uc[c(C, R, {µ + ψR− β}/2α)] + φR + µ{µ + ψR− β}/2α + ψR{µ + 
ψR− β}/2α − α({µ + ψR− β}/2α)
2 − β{µ + ψR− β}/2α 
To derive the expression for marginal utility of one’s own level of human recognition, the above 
expression for utility is differentiated with respect to R.   



















 + φ 
Obtaining the final term of the marginal utility requires differentiating the expression, µ{µ + ψR 
− β}/2α + ψR{µ + ψR − β}/2α − α({µ + ψR − β}/2α)




∂ ) ( π
= µψ/2α + µψ/2α − βψ/2α + 2ψ
2R/2α − ψ(µ + ψR − β)/2α - βψ/2α 
  = µψ/2α − βψ/2α + ψ
2R/2α 
  =  (µ − β + ψR) 



































Appendix 2:  Derivation of First Order Conditions and Comparative Statics in Labor Model 
 
   max   L = αlog(c) + βlog(K-H) + γlog(R) + λ(WH + N - Pc) + µ(rH + R - R)      
(c, H, R) 
 
First order conditions: 
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because R > 0 and α, γ > 0. 69 
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